BY ANDERS ÅSLUND | SEPTEMBER 13, 2012

Amid the carnage of the European financial crisis, the Baltic countries, by and large, are doing quite well. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are booming. Last year, their growth rates reached 7.6 percent, 5.5 percent, and 5.9 percent, respectively. The turnaround, driven largely by manufacturing exports, has been one of the most remarkable and promising stories of the crisis. In 2008-2009, all three countries were badly hit by a nearly complete liquidity freeze, which sank their economies by as much as 24 percent.

Even so, only Latvia required an IMF and EU bailout, and all three returned to growth after only two years of recession. Today, all three Baltic countries have ample access to international financial markets, and their credit ratings have risen steadily since the summer of 2009. The Balts’ rebound stands in stark contrast to the fate of eight mainly southern EU countries — Hungary, Romania, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, Spain, and Slovenia — which either already have or probably will require stabilization programs with external financial support. So what happened?

The simple explanation is that the Baltic countries have pursued the opposite policy of the southern Europeans. In 2009, the Baltic governments each carried out strict austerity, with a fiscal adjustment of about 9.5 percent of GDP, mainly though expenditure cuts and substantial structural reforms. The southern Europeans, by contrast, delivered substantial fiscal stimulus in 2009.

Previously fiscally conservative Cyprus and Slovenia ran up budget deficits of 6 percent of GDP in 2009, but neither benefited from greater growth. Instead, they have been trapped with large budget deficits and are now being overwhelmed by their public debt, admittedly also because of banking crises. One would think, given the divergent outcomes, that a serious economist would advocate for countries to follow the successful example of northern Europe rather than the failed strategies of the south.

Nobel laureate and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman doesn’t seem to see it that way. Throughout the crisis, Krugman has attempted to explain away or even mock the Baltic countries’ success even as they have continued to inconveniently disprove his arguments. On Dec. 15, 2008, Krugman issued his first pronouncement on the Baltic crisis in a post titled, “Latvia is the New Argentina.” He meant that Latvia would have to devalue its currency and perhaps default, as Argentina did in 2001. Neither happened. Latvia returned faster to fiscal health than anybody had anticipated.

Krugman’s claim that devaluation was necessary for Latvia’s recovery (and presumably also Estonia and Lithuania’s) turned out to be wrong. Krugman’s main line of argument has been that more fiscal stimulus is always needed as long as a significant output gap exists. But in Cyprus and Slovenia, very substantial fiscal stimulus generated minimal growth. Neither country would be suffering from its current financial conundrum had it not followed such a policy. Spain would probably be safe as well.

Krugman’s disregard for the risk of sovereign default is perplexing. His main line of thinking seems to be that Europe has a growth problem, not a debt problem, and he appears to believe that a fiscal stimulus can always overcome the threat of the increased public debt burden. Even in the case of Greece, which had a gross public debt of 165 percent of GDP at the end of 2011, he failed to notice the danger but financial markets declared that the country’s public debt was excessive.

Slovenia’s public debt of 50 percent of GDP, for instance, is more than the markets accept, as its bond yields have exceeded 7 percent. It is difficult to understand how Krugman can ignore the structural reforms that are urgently needed in Europe. All the southern European countries have overregulated labor markets that have caused persistently high unemployment. In Spain, it is easier to get a divorce than to sack a worker — which explains in part why companies are very reluctant to hire new ones. But to Krugman, unemployment is merely a matter of lack of demand: “The urge to declare our unemployment problem “structural” — a supply-side problem of some kind, not solvable by the “simplistic Keynesian” notion of just increasing demand — has been quite something to behold,” he wrote on June 8. Greece stands out as the main villain of the European crisis.

Multiple Greek governments had grossly falsified their statistics and maintained an average budget deficit of 7 percent of GDP for the last two decades, refusing to fulfill their EU obligations. The George Papandreou government adopted a stabilization program in May 2010, with more IMF funding than any IMF program in history but one year later it had expanded the already excessive public administration by a net of 5,000 civil servants. Papandreou raised already high taxes rather than cutting public expenditures. Yet incredibly, Krugman calls Greece a victim, laying all blame for its predicament on the EU, the European Monetary Union, and Germany. When he’s not exclaiming “this isn’t a Greek problem… it’s a European problem,” he’s pointing the finger at “the arrogance of European officials, mostly from richer countries, who convinced themselves that they could make a single currency work without a single government.”

More bizarrely, while he considers Greece innocent, Krugman has attacked the far smaller and poorer Baltic countries in perhaps a dozen blog posts. Krugman is not, presumably, some kind of bizarre anti-Baltic bigot. His problem is that they have pursued austerity and succeeded; they prove that Krugman’s analysis of the European crisis is wrong. As it happens, Estonia actually adopted the euro in January 2011, and the Baltic economies appear to have entered a high-growth trajectory.

Krugman’s sour grapes are on full display. He dismissed the success of Estonia, “the poster child for austerity defenders” as insignificant in a June 6 post that provoked the wrath of Estonia’s President Toomas Hendrik Ilves on Twitter. Undeterred, on July 1, he wrote, “the best the defenders of orthodoxy can do is to point to a couple of small Baltic nations that have seen partial recoveries from Depression-level slumps, but are still far poorer than they were before the crisis.” On one rare occasion, Krugman partially admitted a positive effect from austerity: “yes, it’s actually worth noting that essentially nobody has managed to regain the confidence of the markets [through austerity], except for, you know, Latvia, which had almost no debt.” Well, if you pursue austerity, you do escape debt.

The most generous explanation for Krugman’s Baltic blind spot is that he thinks mostly about big states, and perhaps only about the United States. Small, open economies work quite differently. Tiny countries tend to adopt a foreign currency or peg their exchange rates, as the Baltic countries and Bulgaria have done. They cannot allow themselves large budget deficits, because the markets will not allow them as high levels of public debt as the likes of Japan or the United States. Their bond yields will rise at even moderate debt levels, as Slovenia, Cyprus and Spain have discovered.

Another way to look at it is that even when Krugman writes about European economic policy, he is actually only making arguments for what he believes the United States should do. Citizens of the Baltic countries can be grateful that their leaders never listened to Krugman. He advocated devaluation when it proved unnecessary and probably would have been harmful. He has persistently argued for less austerity and more fiscal stimulus everywhere, blatantly disregarding the need for public debt to be sustainable. And the benefits of fiscal stimulus remain dubious, while the drawbacks — excessive budget deficits have forced several countries to accept international bailouts to escape default — are clear for all to see. Krugman praises the fiscally irresponsible and scolds the virtuous, denigrating the Baltic achievements while trying to explain away miserable failures, such as Greece. Doesn’t he see that his advice would only aggravate these crises, while the opposite policies resolve them? How can anybody be so wrong for so long without feeling at least a little bit ashamed?

Anders Åslund Senior Fellow Peterson Institute for International Economics 1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036-1903 Tel: (202) 454-1341 Fax: (202) 659-3225 Email: aaslund@piie.com

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It is absolutely essential to have more coherent, structured, well-framed relations between the EU and Russia, said Thierry de Montbrial, founder and Director General of the French Institute for International Relations IFRI, in an exclusive with EurActiv, on the occasion of Putin’s coming inauguration on 7 May for a new mandate as president.

De Montbrial, who just published a new book, Journal de Russie 1977-2011, spoke as a connoisseur of Russian political life and the country’s leaders, many of whom, including Putin, he has met repeatedly.

He said that Putin’s decade (from 2000 to 2010) had been a “quite positive one”, but expressed doubts as to the success of the new term in office of the Russian leader.

Putin served as President from 2000 to 2008, after having been re-elected in 2004. Under the Russian Constitution, he was barred from a third consecutive term and served from May 2008 as Prime Minister, maintaining his political dominance. Amendments to the Russian constitution changed the term of duty of the President from four to six years, implying that if re-elected in 2018, Putin could lead the country until 2024.

De Montbrial said it was “extremely unlikely” that Putin would do a second term and it might even be quite difficult for him to end this first term.

He said that in spite of his positive record, Putin had recently made a number of mistakes, by failing to anticipate Russians’ surge for freedom and democracy, initiated by those who achieved “a certain social status and certain economic level” thanks to his governance.

But the biggest mistake, De Montbrial said, was the deal with the outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev, with whom Putin’s decided to switch roles.

Indeed, during a choreographed congress of the ruling United Russia party on 24 September, Medvedev agreed to lead a list of candidates for a parliamentary election on 4 December in view of becoming the next premier, and won a standing ovation for Putin by proposing that he run for president in the 4 March 2012 elections.

“My […] conclusion is that it is extremely unlikely that [Putin] will do a second term and it might even be quite difficult for him to end the first term. Because the next six years will I think see a continuation of huge social changes in Russia. Especially if Russia is developing well economically,” De Montbrial said.

Asked about the geopolitical future of a declining Europe with or without Russia, De Montbrial said to reverse such trends the EU must be capable to put its house in order following the eurozone crisis, and that Russia “continues to develop gradually in its own way in a democratic direction”.

“It is absolutely essential to have a more coherent, structured, well-framed policy between the EU and Russia. And this of course is directed against nobody,” De Montbrial insisted.

He also expressed his conviction that the French Socialist candidate François Hollande would win the milestone French presidential elections on 6 May, just one day ahead of Putin’s inauguration.

Read the full interview here:

http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/thierry-de-montbrial-putin-may-finish-mandate-interview-512415

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By Honor Mahony, EUobserver. 30.03.12 @ 18:03

BRUSSELS – The European Parliament is trying to cultivate a “European identity,” with top officials saying that it is the only way to ensure a lasting union between member states.

“National systems have very much invested in constructing their own identity,” Klaus Welle, the secretary general of the European Parliament told an audience at the Centre for European Policy Studies, a think-tank, on Thursday (29 March).

“If we want to build a lasting union of solidarity we also need to invest in European identity. We need to understand history as European history and not just as compilation of national histories.”

Referring to his native Germany, Welle noted that people speak of the country as if it has existed forever. But the modern German state was created in 1871. Before that there was the German Confederation, which also included Prussia and Austria.

Up until Napoleon’s time, there used to be around 300 German-speaking statelets under the Holy Roman Empire.

“It [1871] is very recent. We have reconstructed our own history as if we have always had a nation state which is completely false and untrue,” he added. “In order to stabilise identity, we have created national museums, we have created national curricula, we have reconstructed national history.”

The parliament is now seeking to carry out a similar exercise.

The recently-opened Parliamentarium – a visitor-cum-exhibition centre – is “one attempt to contribute” to a European identity. There are others in the pipeline. A “House of History” – the brainchild of former parliament president Hans Gert Poettering – is due to open in 2014. The parliament is also “rediscovering” the fact that it owns the house lived in by Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Union.

The issue of European identity is a touchy subject. MEPs have often referred to the need for countries to make sure that European history is part of national curricula.

But the suggestion alone raises heckles about interference from Brussels. The European Commission, which has the sole right to propose laws, has no real power in education matters, which remain in the hands of member states.

Much of the identity debate – which also encompasses European values and culture – is bound up in the discussion on how most average Europeans feel removed from ‘Brussels.’

Many of the laws governing their lives emanate from the EU capital. But most people are hard-pressed to name their local MEP or explain what the European Commission does. Politicians compound the feeling by heaping blame on Brussels for a variety of problems, while many media report on the EU from their national point-of-view only.

Welle – a powerful man in the EU bubble, whose job is to ensure the smooth running of the parliament – is currently overseeing an exercise of self-examination by the parliament.

He is compiling a study on where his institution should be in 2025. It was partly prompted by the fact that parliament now has real powers in the EU legislative process but voters turn out in ever-fewer numbers at European elections.

The last one – in 2009 – saw just 43 percent of EU citizens bother to cast a ballot. In some countries the number fell below 20 percent.

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Don´t try to stop the discussion about a common identity for the Baltic Sea region. Keep on amplifying the dialogues and involving everyone from students to elderly people. That´s a sincere call from Prof. Jörg Häckmann, University of Szczecin, who opposes the report of Prof. Dr. Bernd Henningsen.

“The report leaves the reader confused as to whether there is a specific feeling of belonging, of shared traditions in the Baltic Sea region or whether the notion is only a chimera created by some politicians and writers.”

Prof. Jörg Häckmann will not give up the search for a common identity. And he finds Prof. Henningsens report too negative because it narrows the narrative of Baltic history to one authoritative master story upon which a common identity can be built. Instead he want to broaden the space for discussions and dialogues on an online platform:

“With such an open approach, discussions on history may contribute to enhancing a Baltic identity that exceeds national boundaries”.

Does history pose an obstacle to Baltic identity?

By Jörg Hackmann

Publications on the history of the Baltic Sea region have

increased significantly since the fall of the Iron Curtain. This is

hardly a coincidence; instead, it reflects a common desire to

see the new ties and relationships established after 1989 not

only as a phenomenon ex nihilo. If common traditions and

interests can be revealed in the past, so goes the argument,

this could underscore contemporary co-operation. Such

debates about common history and culture in the Baltic Sea

region emerged long before Björn Engholm’s well-known

initiative in the mid-1980’s for a “New Hansa”. Usually such

discourses on history and cultural traditions are framed today

as searches for an identity whose nature is collective, national,

or regional.

We should have these debates in mind when looking at the

initiative of the Baltic Development Forum to explore the

opportunities for a regional branding of the Baltic Sea region.

For this purpose, a report was commissioned from Bernd

Henningsen, former director of the Northern European Studies

Department at Humboldt University in Berlin. His report “On

Identity – No Identity” (with a more complex and scholarly

subtitle – “An Essay on the Constructions, Possibilities and

Necessities for Understanding a European Macro Region: The

Baltic Sea”) was presented at the 2nd Forum on the EU Baltic

Sea Region Strategy in Gdask in October 2011.

Somewhat surprisingly, the title of the report calls into

question the very purpose of the report and frankly states the

author’s conviction that there is no such thing as a Baltic

identity. In Henningsen’s words, a Baltic identity discourse is

“an exaggerated, faux-scientific discussion”. His hypothesis

would have implied either that the report be very brief indeed

or not have been carried out in the first place. Henningsen’s

main argument is that there cannot be such a thing as

collective identity and that therefore, a Baltic identity does not

and cannot exist. Nevertheless, the Henningsen does

acknowledge the possibility of what he calls a “we-feeling”, and

points to things than can contribute to it, such as nature,

architecture, church organs, novels, and many more.

The report leaves the reader confused as to whether there

is a specific feeling of belonging, of shared traditions in the

Baltic Sea region or whether the notion is only a chimera

created by some politicians and writers. Thus, the report raises

several critical issues. Leaving the question aside whether

Henningsen’s claim for the non-existence of collective identity

is supported by sociological and psychological research, two

further aspects need to be addressed: do historical conflicts

between classes, nations, or empires render impossible an

understanding of interactions or shared experience that are not

based solely on conflict? And second, should we reject the

claims for showing recent co-operation to have a historical

foundation by revealing that they are, in the words of Eric

Hobsbawm, inventions of traditions? If we accept

Henningsen’s argument, we would quickly run into historical

fatalism, as conflicts in history would lead into a vicious circle,

where former clashes must necessarily provoke new conflicts;

the early modern wars between Sweden and Poland, for

instance, would make any Polish-Swedish talks about

commonalities impossible.

In fact, such a negative view of history is quite common:

many are convinced that we should not look back, but keep

our eyes only directed towards a better future. Bearing in mind

Walter Benjamin’s renowned image of the angel of history,

which was pushed forward while looking backwards into the

past, one may doubt whether such an understanding of human

existence without considering history is possible at all. Even

beyond this philosophical notion there is a problem in agreeing

to the argument that the “mare balticum” was in fact a “mare

bellicum”. Our perception of the region would then be reduced

to conflicting national interests and world views. But as we

have known for decades, nations are not natural forms into

which mankind is organized, but are outcomes of historical

developments and thus subject to further development and

change. This leads to the second argument, that historians

may unmask recent visions of Baltic history as cultural or

political constructions. Such deconstructions of the Hansa, the

Vikings or the Soviet notion of a “sea of peace” do not imply,

however, that we can get rid of such constructions entirely.

The idea that history can be unveiled and depicted “as it really

was”, was abandoned already some 150 years ago. Even

Henningsen’s references to Baltic nature as identity producing

features are nothing more than cultural constructions, and

rather recent ones at that.

What follows from these critical remarks? First, there is a

broad international quest for perceiving the Baltic Sea region

as a historical entity with common cultural features. Second,

this quest for a non-national, trans- or supra-national

perspective on Baltic history should not be rejected as false

consciousness qua flashback of Leninism. Third, the idea

should be abandoned that there is only one authoritative

master narrative of Baltic history upon which a common Baltic

identity can be built – this seem to be the windmill at which

Henningsen is tilting.

And this leads to a fourth point: we should look at the

history of the Baltic Sea region through a prism of multiple

perspectives – one aspect alone, be it that of the Hansa,

Gustav II Adolf, or tsarist rule – may generate different and

partly contested visions. The research on collective memory

has already paved the way: in making different and even

contested visions visible, they become subject to dialogue.

With this theoretical framework in mind, a Baltic history project

initiated by Academia Baltica in Luebeck, in co-operation with

historians from Szczecin, Riga, Tartu and other universities,

was launched in 2010 and declared one of the priorities during

the German presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States.

The project shall make use of history for exploring

commonalities and differences in the Baltic Sea region; this

means discussing the history of the region not by imposing

answers ex cathedra, but by exchanging views from varying

parts from the region held by everyone from students to elderly

people, and by moderating these views on an online platform.

With such an open approach, discussions on history may

contribute to enhancing a Baltic identity that exceeds national

boundaries.

Jörg Hackmann

DAAD Alfred Döblin Professor

of East European History

Dept. of History and International

Relations

University of Szczecin

Poland

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Read the post: An answer to the Bernd Henningsen report on identity / Read the blog: Baltic Development Forum
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By Hans Brask,
Director, Baltic Development Forum

At the Baltic Development Forum (BDF) Summit in Stockholm in 2009, Lilia Shevtsova, Senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Centre, said that Russia basically did not have a foreign policy, “only” domestic policies. Therefore the study of domestic sources of foreign policy was the best way of achieving greater clarity.

Studying Russia’s view on the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) cooperation from this perspective, we should not expect a foreign policy “reset” as long as Russia’s genetic code will be based on “personalised power”. This piece of DNA will stay unchanged for another presidential term, we now know, as Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev have recently announced that they will just change chairs next year. Russia’s approach to the “west” and cooperation with the “west” will continue unchanged. It may have its ups and downs, and the essence of the cooperation will not differ.

This being said, I recently returned from Kaliningrad with an optimistic view after attending the VII Annual International Conference – Cross-border cooperation, the European Union and Norway, held on 22-23 September. The conference was very well attended by representatives from all the countries around the Baltic Sea and a lot of very concrete cross-border projects were presented and evaluated.

The official speeches all had a very positive tone and demonstrated the interest in improving the present level of cooperation between the North-West territory of Russia and the neighbouring countries, not least within the framework of EU’s cooperation programmes. So, if there is going to be ups and downs, we are surely witnessing an “up”.

This reflects very well the almost unprecedented situation that exists in the BSR at the moment: Almost all the EU countries and Norway are having very positive relations with Russia – at the same time!

At BDF’s advisory board meeting last year in Vilnius, it was decided to make the best possible use of this situation. Time was for engaging with Russia in regional and confidence building activities. At the same time the intensified cooperation among the EU countries should not entail a marginalisation of Russia.

In line with the Vilnius recommendations, BDF and relevant partners have launched a project application within the Northern Dimension framework to promote energy efficiency in Kaliningrad. BDF will lead the project, which will run over two years.

The conference in Kaliningrad this September left the impression that cooperation with Russia has, indeed, intensified in parallel with the implementation of the EU strategy. So that is a very positive trend.

Deputy Prime Minister Zhukov, at the Kaliningrad conference

Listening carefully to the speeches of the Russian representatives in Kaliningrad, one could notice some nuances. Interestingly enough the administration of the Plenipotentiary Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation to the North-West, Sergey Zimin, was among the most positive voices. The North-West district has defined its role and position as a facilitator of cooperation with Russia’s many neighbours in this corner of the world.

The driving-forces behind the cross-border conferences in Kaliningrad are the North-West Development and Investment Promotion Agency – both very close to the presidential envoy. It may be a reflection of the fact that the economic development of the North-West depends on relations with neighbours, but it should be noted that the Governor of Kaliningrad Nikolay Tsukanov and the Deputy Governor from Pskov, Gennadiy Bezlobenko, followed the same line.

But there were other tones as well. The Minister for Regional Development of the Russian Federation, Viktor Basargin, emphasised that Russia and the EU/the Commission had equal rights in the context of Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), including the right to veto.

His ministry had developed a document (“Food for thoughts”) that should match in some way the EU’s strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. So far no less than 61 projects totalling more than 56 million € had been approved for financing under the policy.

The importance of equal partners was underlined several times by speakers representing the Federal Government, including the Foreign Ministry (MID). Deputy Prime Minster Alexandr Zhukov and the MID representative Alexandr Sternik underscored that they saw the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) as the most important institution in the region.

Sternik saw cooperation within the CBSS as improving, turning more concrete year by year, even though some “gaps” still existed. Priorities had to include innovation, modernisation, public-private partnerships and the Baltic energy link. He underlined that the present German CBSS presidency and the next Russian (1 July 2012) had decided to work closely together, not least focusing on the South-Eastern part of the region, which includes Kaliningrad.

A special – and controversial – issue that came up at the conference was the “Baltic nuclear power plant” that Russia is building in Kaliningrad. Preparations are going on in an open and transparent way, Sternik said, with public hearings in place and using international environmental standards.

The nuclear power plant is in fact one of the most controversial issues in Russia’s BSR priorities and policies, and neighbouring countries do not have the same understanding of the process as Mr. Sternik. In actual fact, the plant could develop new controversies similar to the ones that the Nord Stream project gave rise to.

First of all, the capacity of the planned nuclear power plant exceeds local demands. Hence, the project is also to export energy to central Europe. InterRAO, the company responsible for the construction of the nuclear power plant, is considering to place an electrical cable next to the Nord Steam gas pipeline on the bottom of the Baltic Sea in order to reach Germany with electricity in the future.

It remains to be seen, whether Germany will be equally as enthusiastic about receiving nuclear based electricity from Russia/Kaliningrad as it was about gas.

What is the conclusion? – First of all, energy, nuclear power, equal partnerships, right to veto and the privileged relationship with Germany are to stay defining element is Russia’s BSR policies for many years. It makes, indeed, food for thought that Sternik mentioned the nuclear plant as part of a presentation on Russia’s upcoming Presidency role the CBSS from 2012.

Secondly, the Kaliningrad conference demonstrated the genuine will of many Russians who live close to the Baltic Sea Region to engage in closer in regional cooperation. Thus in some respects we seem to be on an up-turn, and the BSR partners should always be ready to integrate Russia in a closer dialogue and in concrete project cooperation, when conditions are right.

At the upcoming BDF Summit/EUBSR Annual Forum in Gdansk next week, we have decided to organise a special Kaliningrad side-event in order to make this last point. We are happy to note that many Russian participants have registered to the event.

See the website for the Kaliningrad event here.

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The review of the EU Strategy is the main topic on the agenda in Gdansk but we will also display the many project activities taking place in the Baltic Sea Region. More than 30 stands will already join the networking village. We will also have a special business rendezvous with Polish and regional business organizations as well as private companies. The title of the consultations in Gdansk should be New Ambitions for the Baltic Sea Region. We need constantly to set new targets and aim higher. If not, integration will fade out. I am sure it will be a great days in Gdansk, and we all hope you will join us. Over the coming months you will receive updating newsletters and information on the different features of the meeting. Registration will open on mid August.

The need for higher ambitions is also the key messages in the two reports that Baltic Development Forum is presenting today: one on mobility of students and teachers, and one on women’s entrepreneurship.

1 July was the beginning of both the Polish EU Presidency and the German CBSS Presidency. Hopefully those two big countries of the region will put a positive fingerprint on regional developments. In this regard, we must not forget the biggest of the biggest, Russia, who will take over from Germany’s CBSS Presidency in 2012. We need all on board.

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Baltic Development Forum welcomes this initiative. First of all because it helps to set some more overall guidance to the regional priorities. It also enables the Baltic Sea Region countries to contribute to Europe’s overall growth discussion. Europe needs growth and the Baltic Sea Region cannot be a winner region globally, if Europe does not find a recipe for growth. Lastly, if the Baltic Sea Region can adjust the two processes so that they fit to the special needs, opportunities and problems that exist in the Baltic Sea Region, then we have better chances to succeed. And that is exactly how smart specialisation should be done.

The next regional 2020 conference takes place in Riga. You can find more information below.

Link to BDF news post on Smart Specialisation in the Baltic Sea Region. More information about the event can be found the EU Commission’s Website.

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The Baltic Business Arena that focuses on matchmaking for SMEs will hopefully also contribute in the same direction, see below. The need for a close link with the Europe 2020 strategy was another conclusion in Stockholm. BDF has been making this point for some time, but the good news is that it is now taken care of through two upcoming conferences: One in April in Malmö and another in May in Riga, see below. BDF is closely involved in both events.

We will be working to present a Digital Action Plan – an issue that was taken up in Stockholm and promoted by Kaja Tael, Undersecretary of European Union Affairs, Estonian Foreign Ministry. We look forward to informing you more on this issue. Even through BDF’s new facebook page which is part of BDF’s internal digital agenda. We hope that you will continue to support and join us!

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